Orlando Mass Shooting

June 12, 2016 – June 17, 2016

After Action Report/Improvement Plan

7/20/2016

Florida Division of Emergency Management

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2. This AAR was developed using the Department of Homeland Security – Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) processes.

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EVENT SUMMARY

At approximately 2 AM EDT on June 12, a shooter entered the Pulse nightclub in Orlando and opened fire. Between 2 AM and approximately 5 AM—when the shooter was neutralized in an exchange of gunfire with law enforcement—49 people were killed, with over 50 injured. The City of Orlando activated its Emergency Operations Center to a Level 1 to coordinate resource support services for victims' families and first responders.

In response to the emergency event in Orlando, the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) activated to a Level 1 at 11 AM EDT, with an initial situational awareness briefing at Noon EDT. All Branches, Sections, and Emergency Support Functions were notified to report to the SEOC and be prepared to support any local protective actions and mass care operations as well as maintain situational awareness. Additionally, elements of the Florida Emergency Mortuary Response System (FEMORS) were deployed to Orlando to assist local resources with victim identification. The Governor signed Executive Order #16-142 declaring a state of emergency for Orange County.

The SEOC scaled back to a Level 2 Activation at 5 PM EDT on Tuesday, June 14, and returned to Level 3 Activation at 5 PM EDT on Friday, June 17.

It should be noted that this was the State EOC's first Level 1 activation since 2012 (Tropical Storm Isaac).

EVENT TIMELINE

Table 1: *Event Timeline (All times are EDT)*

Date	Time	Action
June 12, 2016	1100hrs	State Emergency Operations Center activated to a Level 1 in response to the Orlando mass shooting.
June 12, 2016	N/A	Executive Order #16-142 was signed by the Governor to declare a State of Emergency for Orange County.
June 14, 2016	1700hrs	State Emergency Operations Center goes to a Level 2 activation.
June 17, 2016	1700hrs	State Emergency Operations Center returns to Level 3 activation.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this report is to analyze the actions of the State Emergency Response Team (SERT) by identifying strengths to be maintained and built upon, identifying potential areas for further improvement, and to support development of corrective actions.

MAJOR STRENGTHS

Upon analysis of after-action information provided by Command and General Staff, Branches and Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), the items below were identified as major strengths:

Support to the On-scene Command and to Governor's Office Staff in Orlando
The Division of Emergency Management's Region 5 Coordinator and the Regional Coordination Team Supervisor were posted at the City of Orlando EOC and the on-scene command. While there, they provided situational awareness to the State EOC and coordination for state-level consequence management activities. Additionally, at the request of the Department of Health, the State Logistics Response Center in Orlando was activated to provide logistical and equipment support to the deployed Florida Emergency Mortuary Operations System (FEMORS) team. Also, two mobile command vehicles were requested and provided to support the Governor's Office staff while in Orlando. While the vehicles provided secure working space, it was also mentioned that they provided a barrier for those personnel working on-scene.

Private Sector Coordination
Emergency Support Function 18 (Business, Industry, & Economic Stabilization) coordinated the engagement of JetBlue, Airbnb, and Uber in providing free air and ground transportation and lodging for victims' families. This effort was done in coordination with ESF 6 (Mass Care), ESF 14 (External Affairs-Public Information), and ESF 15 (Volunteers & Donations).

Through a combined effort with Recovery, ESF 18 also achieved an expedited approval for a Small Business Administration (SBA) Economic Injury declaration. This was accomplished through messaging (with ESF 14), business outreach, and information collection through Florida's Virtual Business Emergency Operations Center (FLVBEOC).

Emerging Media and Scalable Technology
Emerging media vis-à-vis social media proved to be useful in the initial stages of the incident. While information from such media can be inaccurate, State Watch Office (SWO) staff monitoring social media identified the incident prior to the initial notification from either Orange County or the City of Orlando. This information prompted the SWO to conduct additional notifications to key DEM personnel and calls to Orange County per established SWO procedures.

The State EOC's common operating picture, GATOR (Geospatial Assessment Tool for Operations and Response) is utilized primarily for large-scale operations. During this smaller-scale localized incident, GATOR was found to be useful in displaying the area impacted. Locational information was obtained from City of Orlando situation reports were mapped for situational awareness, including road closures and businesses undergoing assessments.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT

Several opportunities for improvement in the SERT's overall ability to respond to the incident were identified.

- The SERT should consider how it would respond and provide consequence management support if a similar incident occurred in a smaller, less resource-rich jurisdiction.

- In the first few hours after the shootings, Orlando's citizen information line was overwhelmed with phone calls, prompting a request to the SERT to set up additional lines. While the capability was met, new technologies in disseminating critical information to the public should be explored.

- Because of the nature of the incident (crisis management/law enforcement-centric), information flow was limited. The SERT should evaluate the information sharing between the fusion centers and the State EOC and determine if it has the right tools to ascertain information during such an incident.

- During this incident, the Governor and Governor's Office staff went to the impact area. Two mobile command vehicles were provided for executive staff support while they were in the area. Because it is expected that this will occur for future incident/disaster response efforts, the SERT should anticipate any resource needs of the Governor beforehand and have those resources available.

- The announcement of the Florida Disaster Fund occurred within 36 hours of the incident. During this time, online crowdfunding platforms devoted to the Orlando shooting were being established even though the Florida Disaster fund is always activated. The SERT should work to ensure that information about the Florida Disaster Fund is distributed more quickly to prevent resources from being directed to other—potentially questionable—crowdfunding portals.

IMPROVEMENT PLAN

Below is a compilation of additional challenges along with opportunities and recommendations for improvement. Information was provided by Command and General Staff along with Branches and Emergency Support Functions. This table will serve as an improvement plan and should be considered as an outline for improving processes and procedures through planning, organization, equipment, training and/or exercises. This Improvement Plan has been developed specifically for the State Emergency Response Team as a result of the SERT's response to the Orlando mass shooting.

Table 2: Improvement Plan Matrix

Challenges	Opportunities for Improvement / Recommendations	Primary Responsibility
Continued Everbridge notification issues; some personnel did not receive notifications. Additionally, the call-back instructions in the notification voicemail were found to be cumbersome.	Work more closely with staff and SERT partners to better advertise personal responsibility regarding Everbridge accounts (i.e. updated registration email, regular reminders, and additional SEOC training).	Operations
Expedited process for obtaining mobile command vehicles; had to back into the Mutual Aid mission documentation Form B.	Track documentation for expedited deployments.	Logistics
Mission requests not entered for deployment travel or incomplete for fiscal tracking.	Follow process for mission input so fiscal impacts can be determined and tracked.	Finance/Admin
Partners and staff in State EOC were bypassing Branch Directors to retrieve information from ESFs that Branch Director already had.	Provide information on how to gather information from within the branch to SEOC personnel, etc.	All SERT Branches and Sections
Personnel responding without a mission request-closes window for reimbursement, etc.	Work with partners to train on necessity of mission requests for reimbursement.	Emergency Services Branch
There was some confusion in the Executive Order language. It designated the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) Commissioner as State Coordinating Officer, but did not mention the Division of Emergency Management (DEM). While FDLE has the crisis management responsibility, DEM—as the lead for the SERT—has the consequence management role.	Work to clarify the crisis management and consequence management roles in such incidents and ensure that subsequent orders are addressed accordingly.	Legal

Real time information sharing; information flow is limited in certain events (law enforcement-centric) and that is understood.	Communicate with regional assets to improve the flow of information.	ESF 16
Incident Command System (ICS) Process/SERT Structure is not familiar to some of the ESF 14 partners.	Engage ESF 14 partners with the SERT ICS sections—particularly the Planning and Operations sections—in order to not duplicate efforts and help train on ICS and SERT concept of operations.	ESF 14
There is a need to provide staff training on new and different procedures outlined in the revised ESF-18 Standard Operating Guide.	Provide staff training on new and different procedures outlined in the revised ESF-18 Standard Operating Guide.	ESF 18
Alignment of state and local ESF 18 activities	Transform "Blue Sky" private sector relationships into "Gray Sky" private sector partnerships; Establish a process to align state ESF-18 operational activities with local ESF18 activities.	ESF 18
There is a need to research other available funding resources when there is no federal declaration	Continue more in depth research on available funding resources when there is no federal declaration.	Recovery
Confusion between EOC Action Plan/Incident Action Plan and Situation Report	Coordinate with Planning Section to have additional training on IAP and SITREPS prior to an event.	Recovery/Planning