Deepwater Horizon Response

April 30, 2010 – August 27, 2010

After Action Report/Improvement Plan

3/2/2011

Florida Division of Emergency Management
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1. Recommend broader incorporation of all federal response plans into the National Response Framework (NRF) and update the National Contingency Plan (NCP).

2. Update the Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) to reflect the updated NCP.

3. Review and update the Area Contingency Plan (ACP).

4. Enhance the State Emergency Response Team (SERT) Air Branch.

5. Integrate the State Watch Office (SWO) into Geospatial Assessment Tool for Operations and Response (GATOR).


7. Expand training opportunities for all stakeholders and non-traditional lead agencies.

8. Review and develop best practices for sampling analysis and distribution.

Appendix A: List of Acronyms
Executive Summary
The purpose of this report is to provide information on response efforts during Deepwater Horizon Response. The Florida State Emergency Operation Center (SEOC) was activated for 120 days from April 30, 2010 to August 27, 2010. This report was initiated by the State Emergency Response Team (SERT) for its own review and analysis on the efficacy and efficiency of their performance during that time. It contains recommendations for improving upon operations and procedures for future activations.

The Deepwater Horizon offshore oil drilling platform experienced a major explosion in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010. Initial reports of oil release from the disaster site were limited to by-products of the collapsed oil rig itself, but further examination revealed that the well blow-out preventer was not functioning. Shortly after this discovery, BP confirmed that oil from the MC-252 well site was entering the Gulf. Under the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) of 1990, BP was designated the responsible party, meaning that they would have the statutory obligation to fund all response efforts. President Barack Obama designated the United States Coast Guard (USCG) as the lead federal response agency.

Fire extinguishing, search and rescue, and skimming operations began the following day with off-shore fire suppression vessels. Three attempts were made to shut-down the well, all unsuccessful. The USCG was on scene assisting with response efforts, and the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) began monitoring the response, the fire, and the oil release.

The Unified Command (UC) Mobile was established quickly in response to the spill to allow representatives from federal and state (Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida) emergency management and environmental partners to make consensus decisions regarding objectives, strategies, and plans for dealing with potential impacts of coastal shorelines from the oil spill. Florida sent a Forward SERT to UC Mobile on April 28, 2010. An incident commander(IC)/state on-scene coordinator (SOSC) was designated to represent Florida at UC Mobile with other incident command system (ICS) roles filled by
SERT staff, creating the Florida Branch at UC Mobile. The Forward SERT was fluid and roles were constantly adapting to form a State Management Team (SMT). UC Mobile was staffed with Florida SERT members through August 24, 2010 when the last Florida incident commander demobilized. A small contingent of DEP staff remained at UC Mobile after that time to continue providing support in creating objectives and strategies for the state. In addition, the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWC) continued to provide scientific and technical support deploying personnel to New Orleans Command through October and into November.

The Forward SERT IC speaks with the Vice Commandant of the USCG, Vice Admiral Sally Brice-O’Hara, at UC Mobile

SERT, the USCG and BP set up additional incident commands in St. Petersburg (on May 3, 2010), Key West (on May 19, 2010), and Miami (on May 24, 2010) which were eventually consolidated into Florida Peninsula Incident Command in Miami on June 2, 2010. These incident commands were stood up due to the threat of oil entrainment into the Loop Current, a powerful ocean current that flows north in the Gulf of Mexico before looping back south into the Florida Straits and towards Florida’s East Coast.

The SERT enhanced local control of response operations by establishing four operational Branches in Pensacola (Branch One), Destin (Branch Two), Panama City (Branch Three), and Port St. Joe (Branch Four), the first of which were activated on July 7, 2010. County liaisons and SERT personnel worked with BP and the USCG to transfer the tactical control of response assets to the Branches, allowing for greater input from county and municipal partners. The SERT supported Branch operations, and helped facilitate additional mission requests from local emergency management partners.

It is likely that beaches in Northwest Florida will continue to receive isolated impacts, mainly scattered tar balls, for months to come caused by natural tides and weather conditions. It is possible that immediately following any tropical activity, lingering ocean swells and higher tides could push offshore tar ball fields closer to the coast. State emergency management officials continue to coordinate with
federal, state and local partners to ensure that any further impacts to Florida’s coastline are removed quickly and efficiently.

**Florida's Deepwater Horizon Response – By the Numbers as of April 30 – August 27, 2010**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Days of Activation</th>
<th>120 Days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oil Recovered from Florida’s Shoreline</td>
<td>500,000 Gallons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approximate Miles of Florida’s Coastline impacted</td>
<td>200 Miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total feet of boom deployed in Florida</td>
<td>791,061 Feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest Number of State Employees Working (single day)</td>
<td>657 Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of State Agencies Involved in the Response</td>
<td>19 Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of RECON Reports</td>
<td>8,349 Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Geo-coded photos on flights</td>
<td>81,231 Photos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of EM Constellation Missions</td>
<td>1076 Missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of EM Constellation Information Messages</td>
<td>2250 Info Messages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Florida Counties with Emergency Declaration</td>
<td>25 Counties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Aircraft Fixed- and Rotary- Wing Aircraft Deployed</td>
<td>24 Aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Vessels Deployed</td>
<td>58 Vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of ATVs Deployed</td>
<td>47 ATVs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Mobile Command Vehicles (MCVs) Deployed</td>
<td>5 MCVs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of State Management Teams (SMTs) Deployed</td>
<td>6 SMTs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Best Practices**

Several response methods and efforts utilized during the response to the event were identified. The primary best practices are as follows:

- Reconnaissance (RECON)
- Geospatial Assessment Tool for Operations and Response (GATOR)
- Boom Cell
- Google Docs
- Branch Structure
- Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP)
- Florida Department of Environmental Protection (DEP)
- BP and Coast Guard collocation in the State Emergency Response Center (SEOC)
- Command Briefings
- Business, Industry, and Economic Development
- Unified Sampling and Early Testing
- State Management Teams (SMT)
- Food Service Area
- Volunteer Coordination
- Meteorology
- Close Coordination of State Agencies
• The Florida Emergency Information Line (FEIL), the Florida Oil Spill Information Line (FOSIL), and Outreach
• Adjusting to Operational Needs

Issues and Challenges
Throughout the event, several opportunities for improvement in the ability to respond to the incident were identified. The primary issues and challenges are as follows:

• Unified Command Mobile (UC Mobile)
• Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90)
• Area Contingency Plan (ACP)
• Reimbursement
• Local Integration into Operations
• Rumors and Outreach
• Skimmers and Vessels of Opportunity (VOOs)

Recommendations
The following recommendations are based upon the above best practices and issues and are discussed at the end of this document:

1. Recommend broader incorporation of all federal emergency response agencies in utilization of the National Response Framework (NRF) and update the National Contingency Plan (NCP).
2. Update the Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) to reflect the updated NCP.
3. Review and update the Area Contingency Plan (ACP).
4. Enhance the State Emergency Response Team (SERT) Air Branch.
5. Integrate the State Watch Office (SWO) into the Geospatial Assessment Tool for Operations and Response (GATOR).
6. Develop Reconnaissance (RECON) website on FloridaDisaster.org.
7. Expand training opportunities for all stakeholders and non-traditional lead agencies.
8. Review and develop best practices for sampling analysis and distribution.
Section 1: Detailed Response Timeline
On April 20, 2010, a major explosion occurred on the Deepwater Horizon offshore oil drilling platform.

On April 21, 2010 the SERT began monitoring the incident and remained in close coordination with the United States Coast Guard (USCG).

On April 28, 2010, in a proactive measure, Florida sent a liaison team to the Unified Command (UC) Mobile to enhance the coordination of response planning.

April 29 The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) 3-day oil trajectory forecast showed Florida would begin receiving impacts within the next several days.

On April 30, 2010, a state of emergency was declared in six (Escambia, Santa Rosa, Okaloosa, Walton, Bay and Gulf) Florida panhandle counties by Executive Order 10-99, and the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) activated to a level two. The Executive Order also named the Florida Division of Emergency Management (DEM) Director as the State Coordinating Officer (SCO) and Florida Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) as the lead state agency for the event.

On May 3, 2010, Governor Crist extended the emergency declaration to 19 counties through Executive Order 10-100 to include: Franklin, Wakulla, Jefferson, Taylor, Dixie, Levy, Citrus, Hernando, Pasco, Pinellas, Hillsborough, Manatee, and Sarasota. In addition, the Florida Emergency Information Line (FEIL) was activated to provide Floridians a link to informational resources regarding the Deepwater Horizon response. Later the FEIL was transitioned to the Florida Oil Spill Information Line (FOSIL) on May 13, 2010.

On May 6, 2010, Governor Crist executed a memorandum of understanding for a $25 million BP grant for state and local preparation and response.

On May 11, 2010, Governor Crist established the Gulf Oil Spill Economic Recovery Task Force through Executive Order 10-101


On May 25, 2010 Governor Charlie Crist announced Florida received $25 million from BP for VISIT FLORIDA and local tourist development councils to air a tourism marketing campaign with ads reflecting the accurate condition of Florida’s beaches.

On June 3, 2010, Tar balls begin to wash ashore on Florida’s coastline.

On June 4, 2010, the SEOC was activated to a level one due to impacts on Florida’s shoreline.

On June 5, 2010, Florida Agriculture and Consumer Services (DOACS) and the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWC) announced that the summer oyster harvesting areas in the Apalachicola Bay System will now include harvest on Saturdays, giving fishermen six days of harvesting per week.


On June 10, 2010, Governor Crist signed a memorandum of understanding with BP committing an additional $25-million block grant for state preparation and response costs to combat the impacts of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
On June 11, 2010, Governor Crist announced that FWC will extend seafood licenses set to expire on July 1, 2010, and the 2010 recreational harvest season for bay scallops will open nearly two weeks early.

On June 13, 2010, FWC, in coordination with DEP, DOACS and Florida Department of Health (DOH), issued an executive order to temporarily close a portion of coastal state waters offshore of Escambia County to the harvest of saltwater fish, crabs and shrimp.

On June 15, 2010, Governor Crist, in coordination with FWC, announced a free fishing weekend, June 19-20, to encourage people to get out and catch saltwater fish along Florida’s coastlines.

On June 17, 2010, Governor Crist unveiled Florida Gulf Recovery Jobs, a website managed by the Agency for Workforce Innovation (AWI) that allowed job seekers to locate and apply for positions created in response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.


On June 28, 2010, the Gulf Oil Spill Economic Recovery Task Force met in Pensacola.

On June 30, 2010, DEP hosted an innovative technology review. The event evaluated 10 different technologies that may offer additional capabilities to clean oil impacted beaches along Florida’s coastline.

On July 1, 2010, DOACS announced the extension of the licensing period through August 31, 2010 for the Apalachicola Bay Oyster Harvesting License. In addition, FWC together with federal partners announced the creation of an oiled bird recovery plan for rapid response to distressed birds.

On July 7, 2010, the first of four Florida Branch offices opened up in Pensacola. The branch office served both Escambia and Santa Rosa Counties bringing together federal, state, and local agencies to streamline response efforts and gain better command and control of the response operations.

On July 8, 2010, in response to rapidly changing conditions along Florida’s beaches, DOH in coordination with Gulf coast impacted counties, established new Oil Impact Notice guidance to provide beach visitors with health information when visiting Florida’s beaches.

On July 15, 2010, the MC-252 well was capped and oil was no longer leaking into the Gulf of Mexico.

On July 20, 2010, Executive Order 10-169 was executed authorizing property appraisers to provide interim assessments of properties affected by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster.

On July 21, 2010, SERT announced the removal of supplemental Tier 3 boom within the next 72 to 96 hours in the panhandle counties. The removal was in light of the potential threat of Tropical Storm Bonnie.
On July 24, 2010, The SBA approved Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) programs to aid Collier, Lee and Monroe County residents impacted by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The declaration also covers the contiguous counties of Broward, Glades, Hendry and Miami-Dade.

On July 31, 2010, FWC reopened coastal state waters offshore of Escambia County to the harvest of saltwater fish. NOAA also announced that a new analysis shows Southern Florida, the Florida Keys, and the East Coast are unlikely to experience any affects from the remaining oil on the surface of the Gulf as a result of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.

On August 5, 2010, the SEOC transitioned to a level two partial activation due to the success of the static kill operation, and the progress toward a permanent well-kill.

On August 19, 2010, Reconnaissance (RECON) efforts were stood down and demobilized.

On August 27, 2010, the SEOC transitioned to a level three monitoring activation status. This marked 120 consecutive days of activation, the second longest activation in SEOC history, behind the 137 day activation for the 1998 wildfire season. The SERT continued to respond to impacts as they were reported to the State Watch Office (SWO) and ensured proper cleanup occurred as needed.

On September 19, 2010, 153 days after the explosion at the Deepwater Horizon, the well was determined to pose no future risk due to successful completion of a relief well by intersecting and cementing the well nearly 18,000 feet below the water’s surface.
Section 2: Best Practices

Reconnaissance (RECON)
Due to shifting winds and currents in the Gulf, the State Emergency Response Team (SERT) leadership deployed state RECON assets daily to enhance situational awareness for response operations. As a result, the SERT launched the largest RECON operation in Florida’s history. RECON deployed May 25, 2010 and demobilized August 19, 2010 (86 days). Air crews logged over 1,700 hours of total flight time, and over 200 miles of beach and offshore waters (out to 20 miles) were surveyed daily. The objective of RECON was to photograph, describe, and map the type and the extent of the oil product and its proximity to the shoreline in a timely and repeated manner.

Aircraft flight hour totals for the Deepwater Horizon Response RECON mission (Florida):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Flight Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Division of Forestry (DOF)</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida Highway Patrol (FHP)</td>
<td>79.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escambia County Sheriff’s Office (ECSO)</td>
<td>115.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida Fish and Wildlife (FWC)</td>
<td>594.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida National Guard (FLNG)</td>
<td>593.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Air Patrol</td>
<td>356.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana National Guard (INNG)</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Communication capabilities were aided through several different capacities. A communications/radio technician was stationed both at the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) and in the field, and GPS trackers onboard aircraft and vessels in the field allowed for easy tracking and monitoring of the missions. RECON missions were expanded to include offshore capabilities which provided live streaming video. In addition, the use of State Law Enforcement Radio System (SLERS) and Florida National Guard (FLNG) Remote Emergency Response Node (RERN) relayed verbal reports to include the latitude and longitude to a central RECON reporting coordinator in theater for triage review and later for adding photos.

Maps showing the area of operations, oil trajectories, and RECON reports amongst others, were imperative to situational awareness during the response. The GIS team streamlined the map products by finding the need and producing products in high demand with little duplication of effort. There were few outside or last minute requests because demands were met by the production of the daily products.

Integration of personnel also aided in the success of the RECON efforts. The State Watch Office (SWO) was used as the hub of the RECON coordination team to capture all state impacts. Ground, air and water based teams were able to communicate with the SWO which housed the triage team. Additionally, Air Boss integration into the SWO to include Air Ops, and offshore patrol boat and coordination of multiple agency aircraft in highly congested air space, proved to be successful. The web application for inputting RECON report was rewritten to be specifically catered for this event with the
ability to query sheen, tar balls, or boom reports. The site was also able to support multiple teams entering data.

The Civil Air Patrol took 81,231 geo-coded photos on RECON flights, and provided constant support for the SERT. Adding to the success of the RECON mission was the integration of SERT members on RECON flights, with State issued geo-coded cameras and SD cards. SERT was able to upload and use the information immediately upon returning to the SEOC.

Screen shot showing RECON operations and reports in Northwest Florida

Geospatial Assessment Tool for Operations and Response (GATOR)
GATOR is a web mapping application tool developed and maintained by SERT. It displays the weather radar and tropical system updates, and for the purpose of the Deepwater Horizon Response it tracked reports of oil impacts on Florida’s shoreline along with RECON and cleanup missions. The data is updated in real time and is presented in layers that can be turned on or off depending on the information pertinent to the user. The interactive web mapping tool helps to support emergency preparedness, operations and response in Florida.
The use and breadth of outreach that the GATOR accomplished was one of the greatest successes of the activation; 8,349 RECON reports were submitted and integrated into GATOR. While its intended use was for operations and response efforts it was also used as an outreach tool with many agencies distributing the website to their various constituencies.

**Boom Coordination Cell**

Boom is utilized in the recovery of an oil spill to prevent the oil from contaminating the shoreline and other resources. It is a floating device that contains the oil on the surface of the water and is tied to the seafloor. While there are several different types of boom, the boom that was most commonly used during the response was 18- and 24-inch deep boom in 50- to 100-foot sections. Additionally, a small amount of absorbent boom (cotton wrapping over an absorbent pad) was deployed along some of Florida’s coastline. Boom was secured in place mostly with danforth anchors. However, cement cylinders were used occasionally and tended to cause less environmental damage than the danforth anchors when dragged by high seas or tides.

The area contingency plan (ACP) for each County was designed to designate priorities and locations of boom to protect the vital areas and resources. This was to be developed in coordination with local officials; however the ACP was not developed for an incident of this magnitude. This led to the development of Tier 3 booming plans which allowed the Counties to supplement the initial ACPs with
areas that they thought were the highest priority locally. It also allowed the Counties to take an active role in the operations occurring in their jurisdictions.

*Graphic explanation of boom components*  
*Example of a Danforth*

There was no mechanism in place for boom plan review, boom deployment, and contracting for boom, therefore a Boom Coordination Cell was developed. A Boom Technical Advisor was assigned to the SEOC under ESF 10 (Environmental Protection) starting May 4, 2010, giving credibility to Florida requests at Unified Command (UC) Mobile. The Florida Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) further worked with county partners to expedite the approval of additional booming strategies for the region; the Boom Coordination Cell reviewed and commented on Tier 3 boom strategies presented by each county in the Mobile Sector. The requests were plans ranging from simple to extremely complex. In total, 315,461 feet of supplemental boom (Tier 3) was approved and deployed.

*Boom in Perdido Bay (Florida/Alabama Stateline)*
Google Docs
The use of Google Docs allowed personnel outside of the SEOC to view and access critical documents such as the ICS-213 (Incident Command System resource request form) tracking spreadsheet. Access privileges were also able to be controlled allowing personnel to only have viewing rights, or to have both writing and viewing rights.

Branch Structure
The SERT determined that an enhancement to the current command structure was necessary; therefore it recommended the development of a Branch Structure. The State Management Team (SMT) at UC Mobile was responsible for ensuring the proper support was provided to the branches, and that clear and concise processes were in place to facilitate command and communication.

The transition to the Branch Structure was one of the most important operational changes made during the response showing the SERT’s ability to be flexible in an evolving event. Up until the branches opened, county staff had a challenging time getting up to date and accurate information, and having their voices heard at UC Mobile miles away in another state. With the branches, county staff and BP and USCG personnel were co-located making decision making and problem solving more efficient. All disasters are local, and the improvements seen after the implementation of the branch concept reinforced this theory.

Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP)
The CEMP, outlining the basic structure and framework utilized in dealing with and responding to all hazards, proved once again to be a success.
Florida Department of Environmental Protection (DEP)

Governor Charlie Crist, through the execution of Executive Order 10-99 designated DEP as the lead state agency to coordinate the response activities for the oil spill. The DEP Secretary served as the Florida Incident Commander (IC) and was directly involved with operational decisions. Additionally DEP had representatives deployed in the SEOC, each affected county’s emergency operations center (EOC), UC Mobile, Florida Peninsula Command in Miami, and the Florida Branches.

ESF 10 (Environmental Protection) brought in various key programs from within the Agency to assist with Deepwater Horizon response issues. These included representatives from the Division of Waste Management, Division of Water Resources, Division of Air Resource Management, Office of Coastal & Aquatic Managed Areas, Division of State Lands, Division of Recreation and Parks, Division of Administrative Services, Division of Air Resources Management, Division of Environmental Assessment & Restoration, Office of Technology and Information Services, and six Regulatory Districts around the state.

Working under ESF 10, several specialized cells were developed to maintain command and control of the incident. The cells included an Innovative Technology Cell, a Regulatory Cell, a Beaches Cell, a Contracting Cell, and a Boom Coordination Cell. The Innovative Technology Cell served as a clearinghouse for innovative ideas and new technology. They also planned and presented two beach demos on technology available including tests for effectiveness with the type of oil encountered on Florida beaches. The Regulatory Cell assisted with issues involving waste disposal, identified vessel and equipment decontamination sites, conducted air monitoring and surface water and sediment sampling, coordinated with ESF 8 (Health & Medical Services), provided staff for the Florida Branch Offices, and supported natural resource damage assessments and shoreline cleanup assessment teams (SCAT). The Beaches Cell provided valuable expertise on decisions affecting beach cleanup, beach access, dune protection, oil protection strategies, seagrass impacts, and dredging and scraping activities. The Contracting Cell facilitated contracts for Tier 3 boom and locally controlled skimmers. The Boom Coordination Cell, as discussed above, reviewed boom protective strategies, maintenance, and proper removal of the boom after the threat passed.

All SCAT were dispatched from UC Mobile. After SCAT was initiated in the panhandle, DEP took full responsibility for the State’s representation by scheduling personnel, establishing contact with the affected counties, preparing protocols and report forms to document the State’s findings and activities, and effectively addressing counties needs by answering questions and holding meetings when necessary.

Additionally, DEP staff, in close coordination with SERT members, led the state’s communication efforts from ESF 14 (External Affairs) at the SEOC for more than 100 days.
BP and United States Coast Guard co-location in the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC)
Utilizing the SEOC as a command hub cannot be overemphasized. It is imperative that all operational partners be co-located during the response in order to achieve the highest level of coordination; having representatives of BP and the USCG located in the SEOC allowed this level of operational coordination to happen. The SEOC was well organized with ample resources which helped keep overall response on track. Experts from all areas coming together was recognized and appreciated, and aided in promoting the team concept that is SERT.

Command Briefings
A command briefing was conducted at the beginning of each operational period. The briefing brought together command staff for a factual update of what had occurred in the previous day, and what was going to occur in the near future. The briefing allowed command to focus on the critical issues of the day. Despite centers of command being so geographically spread out (Area Command in Louisiana, Unified Command in Mobile, Alabama, the branches in the Florida panhandle, the SEOC in Tallahassee, and Peninsula Command in Miami), all were able to come together as one unit on a daily basis.

Business, Industry, and Economic Development
As the State dealt with both short and long term economic impacts, a robust ESF 18 (Business, Industry, and Economic Stabilization) response was a critical component of the response. Their efforts and forward thinking led to the creation of the Governor’s Economic Recovery Task Force on May 11, 2010 to help Florida businesses and industries who were losing business and revenues due to the oil spill. The Gulf Oil Spill Economic Recovery Task Force worked with BP and state agencies to assess the economic impact of the oil spill and secure financial assistance as needed. The members committed to ensuring the livelihood of Florida’s tourism and seafood industries, as well as other affected coastal businesses. Three working groups were created as part of the Task Force: Economic Impact Assessment, Communications, and BP Claims Processing.

Unified Sampling and Early Testing
DEP’s early coordination with FWC, Florida Agriculture and Consumer Services (DOACS), and Florida Department of Health (DOH) included sampling and monitoring of the effects, or the potential effects, the oil spill would have on natural resources and human health. DEP conducted water, sediment, and biological sampling, FWC sampled fish tissue and other biological components, and DOACS sampled oyster tissue to establish baseline conditions, or the conditions prior to the presence of oil, throughout the State. Establishment of baseline conditions is a critical part of the Natural Resource Damage Assessment that documents the injury caused by contaminants originating from the compromised Deepwater Horizon well. Sampling was also conducted by DEP and DOH to define the water quality conditions related to public health concerns in close proximity to visible indicators of oil presence, such as tar balls, sheen, and “mousse”. A total of 17,371 samples were collected, some of which were analyzed by state agency labs and some of which were sent to National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) certified labs.
The results from these analyses were assessed against human health and environmental benchmark values to assist federal, state, and local government agencies to prioritize clean-up efforts and to protect and inform the public. The sampling locations, protocols, reports, and explanation of the sampling efforts were disseminated on DEPs website.

**State Management Teams (SMTs)**
Six different SMTs were utilized for support both with the forward element in Mobile, and in the SEOC. These teams came from all over the State of Florida. Bringing in more support aided in better command and control of operations, and provided the opportunity to gain experience that will be vital to future response efforts; the partners were effective as force multipliers in the SEOC.

**Food Service Area**
The food service area was just opened after remodeling in the SEOC and was utilized for the first time during this activation. The new layout with two food service lines and warming trays proved conducive to rapidly serve upwards of 150 personnel. This ensured that personnel could obtain their meal and return to work with little to no wait time. During previous events, the meal line could reach a wait time of 15 to 20 minutes.

**Volunteer Coordination**
Early in the activation, Volunteer Florida coordinated with BP on the management of the voluntary response. With a $100,000 grant from BP, Volunteer Florida provided a variety of training to 201 people from more than 103 Panhandle agencies, developed a new Web-based system for documenting the work of volunteers, supported pre-landfall beach clean-up events that cleared trash from 250 miles of Florida beaches, and coordinated with community agencies and the Corporation for National and Community Service (CNCS) to leverage national service assets. National service members developed Citizen Information Stations in Escambia and Santa Rosa Counties, established a volunteer management system for the Bay Area Food Bank, identified new roles for volunteers and provided technical expertise on a new Community Disaster Services database.

**Volunteer Statistics – April 30 – August 27, 2010**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Hours/Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Visitors to Volunteer Florida Website</td>
<td>3.2 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered Volunteers</td>
<td>19,899 volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporation for National and Community Services Staff</td>
<td>1 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AmeriCorps National Civilian Community Corps (NCCC)</td>
<td>31 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Air Patrol Volunteers</td>
<td>69 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Air Patrol Volunteer Hours</td>
<td>4,760 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FWC Wildlife Para-Professional (68 volunteers/day) Volunteer Hours (ongoing)</td>
<td>16,320 Hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Volunteer Hours</td>
<td>19,471 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Dollar Value of Volunteer Hours</td>
<td>$845,488.00 ($20.85 per hour)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ESF 15 (Volunteers & Donations) partners conducted “Camp Beyond the Horizon” to address behavioral and stress issues related to the oil spill; 128 children attended the five camps that were funded and
managed by Florida Department of Children and Families (DCF). Additionally, ESF 15 developed new relationships with DEP, FWC and environmental groups that will result in additional ESF 15 support agency memoranda of understanding. Registered oil spill volunteers were urged to “get affiliated” and to train pre-disaster to meet the future needs of these groups.

Service to residents affected by the oil spill continues as AmeriCorps VISTA members conduct individual needs assessments, teach financial literacy, provide peer-to-peer listening, and staff a service center for oil-impacted residents.

Meteorology
The impacts and response of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill was dependent on several weather factors. Many of these factors have an inadequate network of observing stations necessary to make accurate forecasts and operational decisions. The State Meteorological Support Unit used the 3-day oil trajectory forecast maps (first released on April 29) from NOAA to explain the ocean currents and surface wind forecasts. They also provided severe weather and its possible impacts on the response efforts, along with heat indices for ground crews, and the tropical outlook once hurricane season commenced in June.

Two of the major successes were the Simulating WAves Nearshore (SWAN) model from the National Weather Service (NWS) in Tallahassee, and heat index forecasts. The SWAN model, which assisted in the operations of skimmers and other vessels, was upgraded and run daily. For ground crews, heat was a major weather-related issue during the event. The National Digital Forecast Database’s forecast graphics were not high enough in resolution to accurately display the heat index. NWS Tallahassee staff designed a new graphic specifically for Florida operations showing a detailed map of the north-central Gulf Coast with contoured lines of expected heat index temperatures per 5 degrees of Fahrenheit.

NOAA’s Shoreline Impact Outlook showing the location of potential impacts to Florida’s Coast
NWS Mobile and Tallahassee also aided in weather assistance for overnight beach clean-up crews during thunderstorms. Staff at these offices called UC Mobile during the night shift to alert them of lightning within 10 miles of the coast so ground crews could find shelter if necessary.

The Oil Spill Academic Task Force also proved to be a success. This task force provided additional modeling and information throughout the event, embarking on research missions, and releasing drifter buoys that assisted in ocean current monitoring.

One major challenge that placed Florida in extreme vulnerability was the Loop Current and its forecast. The timing of the oil potentially reaching the Florida Keys was essential for preparations. The State Meteorologist was tasked with, and successfully calculated the possible arrival of oil for all Florida Peninsula counties.

**Close Coordination of State Agencies**
Although DEP was the lead agency, as with any disaster, other State agencies played a large role in the SERT and the success of the response efforts.

**Agency for Workforce Innovation (AWI)**
The mission of AWI throughout the disaster response was to employ as many Floridians as possible. The vessels of opportunity (VOO) program run by BP out of UC Mobile was successful in giving unemployed boat operators, who were out of work because of the oil spill, the opportunity to work through the summer. 25,000 Floridians were trained and ready to work at any given moment during the operations. As many as 3,000-4,000 unemployed Floridians were working daily on the oil spill. AWI developed relationships with those who were hiring for work involving the VOOS, decontamination, and beach clean-up. A process and system were developed to ensure that locals were hired instead of bringing in people from other areas. AWI managed a pool of workers available to do the assignments necessary. AWI also aided in developing a website for Floridians to apply for jobs from 200+ employers related to the oil spill locally (www.floridagulfrecoveryjobs.com). 14,564 oil spill positions were advertised with 46,486 referrals made through AWI and regional workforce boards.

**Attorney General/Department of Legal Affairs**
The Attorney General’s Office, in coordination with Governor Crist, established the Oil Spill Legal Advisory Council. The Team is co-chaired by two former Attorneys General, Jim Smith and Bob Butterworth, and is focused on the rights of Florida consumers and businesses and the protection of the State and its citizens. The Legal Advisory Council is working with state agencies to prepare for possible future litigation, enforcement, or regulatory action that may be needed. In addition, the Florida Bar Foundation and Florida Legal Services provided training to attorneys on how to assist the public obtaining legal services and filling out the forms provided to them by BP.

**Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (DOACS)**
DOACS took the lead in dispelling nationwide rumors that all Florida seafood had been contaminated and was not fit for consumption. In coordination with DOH, DOACS tested the current seafood harvest and tested previously packaged seafood as well.
**Department of Children and Families (DCF)**

DCF’s focus was on the impact the oil spill had on long term behavioral health issues for impacted communities and their citizens. They received a $3 Million grant from BP and continue to be actively involved with local service providers to assist those with behavioral health needs in Florida’s panhandle. DCF coordinated behavioral health response proposals with the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration and with counterpart agencies in Alabama, Mississippi, Texas and Louisiana. The Department distributed tip sheets and psycho-educational materials throughout the Panhandle to foster stress management and coping skills and to encourage access to services for impacted individuals and families. The Secretary of DCF is the Chairman of the Claims Process Working Group that was created as part of the Governor’s Oil Spill Economic Recovery Task Force to aid in this process and advocate for those impacted by the oil spill.

**Department of Financial Services (DFS)**

The Chief Financial Officer (CFO), as the leader of DFS, through her offices, conducted a total of 71 consumer outreach and business roundtables in 19 different impacted counties. The business roundtables with area businesses helped to explain the BP claims process and to provide guidance on required documentation. In addition, the CFO activated the consumer helpline to assist Florida business owners with questions about how the spill would impact their businesses. The helpline also provided assistance to Floridians on documenting expenses related to protecting their businesses for reimbursement. There were over 80 calls to the Helpline.

To assist with making final payments and tracking final costs, the CFO launched a website allowing Floridians to track state expenditures in response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The website provided transparency regarding how BP grant dollars were being distributed for reimbursement for their response and recovery efforts.

**Department of Health (DOH)**

DOH, as part of ESF 8 (Health & Medical Services), closely monitored health impacts to Florida including oil impacts on the beach and the effects those impacts imposed on humans. County Health Departments in coordination with DOH issued health advisories and oil impact notices. In conjunction with the DOACS, DOH monitored the safety of seafood harvested from the Gulf Coast. Three Oil Impact notices and nine Health Advisories were issued and as the conditions changed the advisories were rescinded.

There were many complicated health issues and concerns with little literature or research to provide guidance. DOH subject matter experts developed the science and literature as the situation and response evolved. The State Surgeon General was heavily involved in developing multi-state coordination in the Environmental and Public Health Task Force, Toxicology Task Force, and the Fish Consumption Advisory Task Force.

The primary mission of the Environmental and Public Health Task Force was to collect and disseminate information across the four affected Gulf Coast States. They advised UC Mobile on a daily basis on situation updates relative to the public health concerns occurring across the area, and also aided in
contingency planning issues. The Toxicology Task Force utilized representatives from federal, state, private, and academic areas, to identify and attempt to establish appropriate benchmarks relative to the spill. They also provided a design for sampling methodology to assess long term issues related to oil and oil products. The Fish Consumption Advisory Task Force Functioned much as the toxicology sub-group in using appropriate federal, state, and local agency representatives to determine what affects the spill was going to have on fish and shellfish consumption, whether commercial or recreational. They also produced a long term sampling plan for potential use by agricultural and other appropriate state agencies relative to fish and shellfish sampling.

Oil Impact Notice on the beach in Okaloosa County, Florida

**Department of Transportation (DOT)**

DOT personnel lead the Maritime Transportation System Recovery Unit (MTSRU) and worked closely with the USCG. Updates on Florida waterways were provided daily to the USCG, who would ask for, and would address any concerns that Florida may have had about the closure of their waterways. Co-location with the USCG can be directly attributed to the success of DOT at UC Mobile.

DOT provided support for decontamination and waste management plans ensuring that waste collected at sites was properly disposed of before being transported onto Florida’s roads. DOT also oversaw operations to ensure that boats were properly decontaminated.

**Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWC)**

Throughout the response effort, the FWC contributed scientific guidance and GIS mapping assistance to decision-makers who developed response and cleanup strategies. FWC personnel were on duty at UC
After Action Report/Improvement Plan: Deepwater Horizon Response
March 2, 2011

Mobile, St. Petersburg, Key West and Miami, as well as at the SEOC throughout the various stages of the response effort.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Recovered Alive</th>
<th>Total Recovered Dead</th>
<th>Total Recovered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Birds</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turtles</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Working with DEP, the FWC conducted pre-impact wildlife assessments. These included collecting water samples and examining sediments, fish and shellfish along Florida's coastline and into the Gulf of Mexico. The FWC also evaluated critical habitat, shorebird and sea turtle nesting areas, as well as other wildlife-related concerns. FWC staff pursued solutions to challenges facing Florida's fish and wildlife, ensuring attention was given to issues such as submerged oil, wildlife response and recovery, and natural resource protection. FWC was involved in the recovery and translocation of several hundred turtle nests resulting in the hatching and subsequent release of over 14,000 turtle hatchlings. The FWC took action with its partners, when it was necessary, to address concerns regarding potential threats to Florida's fish and wildlife.

As noted above, at the height of the oil spill response, staff from FWC was involved in locating the presence of oil through RECON missions. The FWC had scientists aboard vessels offshore, and their Division of Law Enforcement engaged vessels, helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft to conduct regular RECON flights to monitor Florida's shoreline for the presence of oil.

**Florida National Guard (FLNG)**

Through ESF 13 (Military Support), the FLNG identified and coordinated military support missions in Florida. Through their Title 32 status all associated costs were reimbursed by the Federal Government. These missions included liaisons to Area Command (AC), UC Mobile, and local EOCs. They also provided planning support, public affairs support, ground and aerial RECON of Florida coastal regions, and
communications support. The Florida Air National Guard (FLANG) was a valuable player in the coordination of all air assets by utilizing Unified Air Operations at Tyndall Air Force Base. They also assisted in bringing consistency to the planning processes and daily operations that occurred throughout the response. At UC Mobile the FLNG coordinated the USCG needs with the FLNG available resources, which included both personnel and equipment. In total, 128 Guardsmen were deployed for the response.

**Governor’s Office of Tourism, Trade, and Economic Development (OTTED)**

OTTED, as a part of ESF 18 (Business, Industry & Economic Stabilization), provide leadership for the Governor’s Oil Spill Economic Recovery Task Force. They approved the release of the VISIT FLORIDA Economic Risk Response Fund and also activated the Emergency Bridge Loan Program per the Governor's instruction. As of the week ending October 15, 2010, OTTED had approved and awarded 145 Emergency Bridge Loans for a total of $3.419 million. To date, $32 million in Tourism and Marketing funds granted to Florida have been disbursed.

**Outreach, the Florida Emergency Information Line (FEIL), and the Florida Oil Spill Information Line (FOSIL)**

Outreach efforts included a multi-agency website for all information related to the oil spill such as health advisories, air and water quality sampling results, press releases, response plans and more. SERT members were also deployed throughout the Gulf region to represent Florida in the Joint Information Centers (JIC) in Mobile, St. Petersburg, and Miami.

Media inquiries were facilitated by staff in ESF 14. This included interviews with international, national, state and local media outlets that were available for viewing by individuals worldwide. Additionally, interested media signed up to receive press releases and updates, including the daily “roll-out,” a document sent to the media each morning containing boom numbers, reconnaissance efforts, impact reports of where oil was sighted, trajectories, a link to GATOR, and other important data.

The public was also able to sign up for daily email updates. To ensure accurate information was available on all platforms, a Twitter account was launched specifically for the event. Staff actively monitored newspaper reports and social media sites to identify and correct any false information being circulated and built upon existing relationships with members of national, state and local media.

SERT leadership and outreach staff statewide were engaged in these communication efforts. They participated in a number of public service announcement tapings and public meetings, ensuring the general public was updated on the latest response information and had a forum to voice their questions and concerns.

Messaging was effective from the SEOC. There was extensive coordination with the State’s Legislative and Congressional partners in coordinating meeting schedules and visits to the SEOC whenever necessary. The daily roll out and daily situation reports were sent out to the State Legislative and Congressional partners, amongst others.
Florida’s Public Outreach and Information – By the Numbers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FEIL Phone Calls</th>
<th>334 Calls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FOSIL Phone Calls</td>
<td>8,619 Calls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press Releases</td>
<td>196 Press Releases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Calls</td>
<td>More than 1,000 Calls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media on Distribution List</td>
<td>142 Contacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacts on Deepwater Horizon Email List</td>
<td>2,500 Contacts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Distinct visits to Deepwaterhorizonflorida.com</td>
<td>887,000 Visits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hits to Deepwaterhorizonflorida.com</td>
<td>12,224,900 Hits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twitter followers of @FLDEPAAlert</td>
<td>1,426 Followers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to these efforts, a public information line was activated for the event. The FEIL traditionally runs 0700 to 1900 and is staffed by personnel from the Florida Department of Community Affairs (DCA) along with other state agencies. However due to the size and length of this disaster the staffing was contracted out to a private entity that produced pre-recorded messaging for the line, and whose capacity was much greater than that of the state agency FEIL teams. The FEIL was active from May 3 to May 10 after which time FOSIL was activated through August 27. Residents and visitors could call the FOSIL for updates on the state's response activities, information on volunteer opportunities, protective tips for homeowners and businesses, and safety and health information. The FOSIL was staffed with live operators from 0700 to 1800 and incorporated an after-hours message with information on operator hours and online resources such as the Deepwater Horizon website. Contracting with a private entity for this service allowed FEIL teams to be available should the state experience simultaneous events such as a hurricane or another disaster during Deepwater Horizon activation.

Adjusting to Operational Needs

Due to the duration and changing nature of any maritime event, the Deepwater Horizon spill is most accurately characterized as a sequence of associated events than as one continuous activation. As the currents, weather, and flow changed, the nature of the response itself ebbed and flowed. It was also a different event in each state. Over time Louisiana received the majority of the direct oil impacts, while Mississippi, Alabama and Florida were in a defensive mode. This defensive mode required a flexible resource allocation as the oil threat moved with tides.

In recognizing the changing nature of the event, the Forward SERT team composition was adjusted to meet those changing needs. Initially the event was in emergency management response mode; therefore the Forward SERT was made up of mostly Florida Division of Emergency Management (DEM) personnel. However, the response efforts quickly became environmentally driven and the Forward SERT Incident Commander was changed to a DEP lead to capitalize on their experiences and authorities. Additionally, when the Branches were stood up the response became more tactical, therefore DEM resumed the lead at the Branch level, and when operations shifted from response to recovery, the lead transferred to DEP. This demonstrated the flexibility of the SERT as well as the Incident Command System (ICS) structure. The flexible nature of Forward SERT personnel to capture the changing nature of
the response (e.g. volunteer coordination, environmental concerns, law enforcement aspects leadership, employment issues, business engagement) reflected positively on Florida and the SERT leadership.

Throughout the activation the development of multiple contingency plans was necessary to ensure transparency, efficiency, and continuity of operations with the changing conditions. Plans that were created and finalized during the activation include: the Severe Weather Contingency Plan, the Transition Plan, the Insitu Burning Plan, an Aerial Dispersant Plan, and a Solidifier Plan.
Section 3: Issues and Challenges

Unified Command Mobile (UC Mobile)

A Unified Command is an appropriate command structure when working across jurisdictional lines. However, UC Mobile was in reality an Area Command (AC). Due to the complexities of the event and the differing impacts, each state should have been given its own command authority. Command of three states proved to be far too complicated and command structure too large. Command and control proved difficult to achieve due to the vast numbers of personnel in UC Mobile. Many of these were oil spill response contractors adding to the confusion and lack of institutional coordination. The three states found themselves competing for limited resources versus having specific resources assigned to each state and coordinated by each state’s command structure. Command and control was only gained by implementation of the branches in Florida later in the event.

Inside UC Mobile Headquarters

Embedding the Forward State Emergency Response Team (SERT) into the established sections at UC Mobile early helped to develop relationships. While UC Mobile incorporated principles of the Incident Command System (ICS), changes had limited the Forward SERT to two tables that were no longer embedded into the established sections and located far from the operational work area. Functioning in an insular Florida team created communication barriers, and was less effective than having Forward SERT personnel embedded in the standing structure. This left much of the work to the Forward SERT Incident Commanders (IC) who attended meetings that only IC level personnel were allowed to attend. A new concept eventually implemented had Forward SERT personnel sitting next to their appropriate counterparts, providing a level of cooperation not previously seen.

The operational period for the Incident Action Plan (IAP) was initially a 24-hour cycle at UC Mobile. This short period was woefully inefficient as personnel constantly had to attend “Planning P” meetings to
plan for the next operational period. Because of this there was little time to observe the actual changing conditions of the event, and to determine if the plan was working or to react properly to the changes. The process became more important than the product itself.

There was a vast amount of personnel at UC Mobile causing redundancy amongst the different sections with broken messages; it became a workspace with high turnover, instead of a place where decisions were made. The approval process in UC Mobile was extremely cumbersome due to the need to meet the requirements of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90).

**Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90)**
The Stafford Act utilizes the National Response Framework (NRF), and the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) 90 utilizes the National Contingency Plan (NCP), however the two plans are not consistent with each other. After 9/11 all agencies under the Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5) were mandated to work under the NRF. ICS and National Incident Management System (NIMS) are components of the NRF but are not all of it. The basic response was dictated by the United State Coast Guard (USCG) day to day structure and not the nationally recognized NRF. OPA 90 was not designed for an oil spill of this kind; it was designed for a ship spill.

**National Contingency Plan (NCP) and Area Contingency Plan (ACP)**
The NCP was designed in response to the Exxon Valdez and MegaBorg oil spills. The Deepwater Horizon spill exceeded the assumptions of the NCP by crossing numerous jurisdictional boundaries, and highlighted the inflexibility of the plan. In addition, the reimbursement process was not clearly defined in the NCP.

The ACP provided a good starting point for protection strategies; however it was insufficient to cope with a spill of this magnitude and was not designed for a spill hundreds of miles away. Further, there was little communication and familiarization regarding the plan that included limited protective strategies for tar balls. Counties were generally unaware of prior planning activities and demanded protection beyond that planned by the ACP. Managing expectations of the counties from the onset and relaying the information to the county and local governments immediately is required in order to create and execute an effective plan.

The lack of a comprehensive booming plan and a vulnerable resource list hampered the initial response. An emphasis was placed on getting things accomplished quickly with little working knowledge on the concept of booming from all parties. Educational material on booming strategies should have been provided prior to reviewing and adjusting the counties’ plans. Additionally there was a lack of direction given to the counties on what was going to be provided by the BP block grant versus the ACP, and how to make a request for booming strategies in EM Constellation (EMC).

The counties’ expectations of operations followed the Stafford Act Model. Most counties were unaware of the NCP or the ACP response strategy. Due to a lack of communication by UC Mobile, the counties were unaware of the location to which the Tier 1 boom was to be deployed, nor did they understand the timetable for deploying Tier 2 boom. Because of this the counties started to request additional boom in
EMC that was already listed in the ACP, and this required additional time to de-conflict to prevent duplication of the strategy.

**Reimbursement for Government Claims**

Deepwater Horizon created financial strain on state and local governments, yet the reimbursement process and eligibility of costs for government entities lacked a consistent procedure. The reimbursement process would begin and then would be changed again and again, with additional steps added in, delaying the process further. This process was far different from reimbursement processes under the Stafford Act. The standard operating procedures for its utilization lacked full development which caused confusion to the State and local entities.

Conflicting and changing guidance hindered the reimbursement process. Having a liaison from both BP and the USCG co-located in the SEOC was extremely beneficial. They were able to help walk through the process step by step.

There are several funds from which reimbursement may be paid out of for claims related to Deepwater Horizon:

1. The National Pollution Funds Center via the Pollution Removal Funding Authorization (PRFA) is a reimbursement process through the USCG for approval and payment.
2. The Government Entity Claims process (213 – BP Claims) is for individuals, businesses, government, and non-profits claims.
3. The Block Grant Process, which was $50 million that was received directly from BP to the State (DEM), for recovery of preparedness and response costs. $32 million was received for tourism and marketing efforts.

**Local Integration into Operations**

This incident was unlike anything ever experienced in Florida. In other disasters typically seen in Florida, counties and local governments are fully involved and engaged in response efforts in their jurisdiction. During the oil spill, BP was the responsible party and they were the ones tasked with coordinating the response. Having an outside, private business in charge of a local disaster proved challenging. At the outset of the spill, information flow to the local jurisdiction was difficult and command/control decisions were not centered at the local/county level, as they would be for a hurricane type event. Once the Branch structure was implemented and the event evolved, counties were given a seat at the table with BP and the USCG and were able to play a more vital role in the decision making in their jurisdiction.

**Rumors and Outreach**

A significant amount of time was spent correcting rumors from media reports. Rumors were perpetuated by multiple sources which forced the State to continuously respond to innuendos and urban legends. UC Mobile’s lack of a single Joint Public Information Officer (PIO), and unified message, allowed many rumors to circulate and stifled proactive initiative. In addition, the information from the JIC was controlled by BP. The rumors were fought by the State as effectively as possible by calling
reporters from various media outlets to dispute inaccurate reports, as well as calling other federal, state and local entities if misinformation was being distributed.

The media driven rumors posed a high demand for public outreach at all levels of government taking into account message effectiveness and information overload. Use of new methods of information sharing such as social media and dedicated websites need fine tuning for sharper targeting. A major challenge was the ability to sustain a message to the public for such an extended period of time while conditions were ever changing. The Geospatial Assessment Tool for Operations and Response (GATOR), the daily roll out, and daily situation reports helped to combat this challenge by providing the latest information on the state’s response.

In addition, although scientific research indicated early on that the threat of impacts of fresh oil or tar balls beyond the Panhandle was unlikely, efforts by the SERT to tell the entire story were hindered. The numerous press releases from several reputable scientific organizations regarding the probability of impacts brought unnecessary impacts to Florida’s tourism. Because of these press releases, the State Meteorological Support Unit partnered with ESF 14 (External Affairs) to release a statement clarifying the incomplete information that was released.

The stress and anxiety generated by this response on members of the public and members of the response community called for a behavioral health outreach and public education response that was not supported by any identified funding mechanisms. Providers addressed needs in their communities exclusively with limited existing resources, and relied heavily on non-profit and voluntary agency stakeholder support. Disaster behavioral health response in this event was hindered by a lack of clearly defined and available sources of emergency financial support.

**Skimmers and Vessels of Opportunity (VOOs)**

Skimmers and the ability to obtain the right type of equipment for the job was a challenge. There was limited command and control of the vessels working the operation. The inability to coordinate the total number of skimmers available and the types of skimmers that were available, and to have them dispatched in a timely manner to sensitive areas, especially bay areas, was a challenge until the establishment of the Branches. At no time during the operations could an accurate number be given on the number and types of skimmers in the area of operations. There was no mechanism in place to communicate with them when they were on the water and no way of tracking their location and progress. Trackers were offered and given by the State of Florida for use during the operations. This marked the first time that UC Mobile had any knowledge of where the units were in the water. They were referred to by numerous different names such as in-shore skimmers, or WTFS, or simply community response vehicles.
Section 4: Recommendations
The following recommendations are based on the above issues and best practices:

1. Recommend broader incorporation of all federal response plans into the National Response Framework (NRF) and update the National Contingency Plan (NCP).
   - Requested of applicable Federal Government agencies

   The purpose of the NRF is to enable all response partners to prepare for and provide a unified national response to disasters and emergencies of all sizes – an all-hazards approach to domestic incident response. The NRF incorporates the public- and private-sectors as well as non-governmental organizations and provides an understanding of incident response roles, responsibilities, and relationships. The NRF is applicable to all disasters, including non-Stafford Act incidents, and has proven to be a success as a response mechanism. The NCP should be reviewed and updated to reflect the lessons learned from this event. The update should include a defined reimbursement process for claimants with a system which mirrors the tested and familiar Stafford Act process.

2. Update the Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) to reflect the updated NCP.
   - Tasked to SERT

   Upon completing the update to the NCP, update the State CEMP to incorporate any applicable changes made to the NCP.

3. Review and update the Area Contingency Plan (ACP).
   - Requested of or tasked to all applicable Federal, State and Local Partners

   Review and update the ACPs to include lessons learned from the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill including the identification of gaps that necessitate additional booming requests. The update should incorporate position assignments along with their duties and authority. It should also incorporate all threats, protective strategies and an executive summary or quick guide for quick reference of the document. The ACP should be reviewed on a regular basis to ensure familiarity for all agencies involved.

4. Enhance the State Emergency Response Team (SERT) Air Branch.
   - Tasked to SERT Air Branch Director

   The handling of air operations during Operation Haiti Relief and Deepwater Horizon responses provided a blueprint in which to develop a SERT Air Branch. Imperative to this is embedding, relationship building, and good communications. These three areas greatly helped with direct access to airframes (fixed wing and rotary) that were not State-owned during the responses. Standard Operating Guidelines (SOGs) for the Air Branch should also be finalized.

5. Integrate the State Watch Office (SWO) into Geospatial Assessment Tool for Operations and Response (GATOR).
   - Tasked to SERT Planning and Operations Sections
It is recommended to integrate the SWO into GATOR for improved tracking and reporting. This includes developing a system for GATOR to be utilized in its fullest capacity as a tool reflecting all incidents reported to the SWO on a daily basis, not just during disaster response operations. SWO personnel should be fully trained on GATOR and have the ability to update GATOR in real time as incidents are reported.

   - Tasked to GIS Resource Unit

Develop a RECON specific website on FloridaDisaster.org. The website should contain a link to the RECON Reporting site. The RECON reporting site should continue to improve and evolve to allow for multiple forms of GPS coordinate input and specialization of report per event. Further integration of detailed information into the RECON Reports per event should also be a priority.

7. Expand training opportunities for all stakeholders and non-traditional lead agencies.
   - Tasked to all applicable government agencies

Training is needed for field assignments, critical roles in the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC), mission assignment input, tasking and tracking in EM Constellation, and standard procedures for planning and operations. Prior to working in an EOC, or in the field, it is recommended that personnel be trained in IS 100, IS 200, ICS 300, ICS 400, IS 700 and IS 800. General and Command staff personnel should receive training in one of the following position specific trainings prior to responding to the incident:

- E 951 All-Hazard Incident Commander
- E 957 All-Hazard Liaison Officer
- E 953 All-Hazard Public Information Officer
- E 963 All-Hazard Plans Section Chief
- E 959 All-Hazard Operations Chief
- E 974 All-Hazard Finance/Administration
- E 968 All-Hazard Logistics Section Chief

8. Review and develop best practices for sampling analysis and distribution.
   - Tasked to SERT with DEP as lead

Review the use of potential alternative laboratories such as state universities or contract laboratories to conduct the analyses for future incidents. This should also include a review of available best practices to ensure sampling results are available to the response community and the public in a timely matter. Decisions regarding monitoring sites and other key operational areas should be openly communicated and considered on a county by county basis.
## Appendix A: List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Area Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>Area Contingency Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWI</td>
<td>Agency for Workforce Innovation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEMP</td>
<td>Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFO</td>
<td>Chief Financial Officer</td>
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<td>DCA</td>
<td>Florida Department of Community Affairs</td>
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<td>Florida Department of Children and Families</td>
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<td>Florida Division of Emergency Management</td>
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<td>EM Constellation</td>
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<td>Emergency Operations Center</td>
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<td>Executive Office of the Governor</td>
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After Action Report/Improvement Plan: Deepwater Horizon Response

March 2, 2011

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